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THE ROMANIAN IRON GUARD: FASCIST SACRALIZED POLITICS OR 
FASCIST POLITICIZED RELIGION? 
By Jordan Meale 
Jordan Meale has a BA from University College London, at the School of Slavonic and East 
European Studies, and is currently in the process of completing the MA with the same school. 
His research interest is on the development of fascism as a cultural and political movement in 
central and eastern Europe. 
The Romanian Iron Guard, or The Legion of the Archangel Michael, has attracted 
much attention by historians as a unique branch of fascism. Such interest descends from the 
fact that the movement held seemingly genuine Orthodox Christian principles, and as such 
plays an important part in our understanding of the relationship between fascism and religion. 
By way of a background to this relationship in Romania, the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries saw Romanian intellectuals debate between the notions of modernization and 
traditionalism. From these debates traditionalists increasingly sought a moralist return to 
traditional Orthodox roots, based upon the peasantry of Romania. Such demands grew from 
the desire to counteract the modernizing foreign principles of democracy and “Judeo-
Bolshevism” that were seen to urbanize and taint an otherwise rural and morally pure 
nationality.
1
 Orthodoxy was found to be the source of the Romanian peasant morality, and
thereafter became intrinsically linked by traditionalists to Romanian nationality.  The First 
World War brought the delegitimization of liberal democratic principles, which destabilized 
the left wing movements throughout Eastern Europe. This political vacuum enabled the 
1
 Rebecca Haynes, “Work Camps, Commerce, and the Education of the ‘New Man’ in the Romanian Legionary 
Movement,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 51, Issue.4 (2008): 945. (hereafter, Haynes, Works Camps). 
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development of popular nationalist right wing movements across Europe during the 1920s, 
which utilised religious symbolism, spiritualism and morality as a part of their political 
movement, of whom the apotheosis was the Iron Guard.
2
 Interestingly, however, 
historiography has been divided between interpretations that deem the religious aims of these 
movements as fundamental,
3
 and those that regard these aims as merely a propagandist 
exploitation of popular religious sentimentalities for political gain. It is the aim of this essay, 
therefore, to examine the Romanian Iron Guard’s relationship to Orthodoxy, and spiritualism 
more generally. Based on this, a defense of the Legion’s Orthodox spirituality will be 
developed, based upon the writings of the Guard’s charismatic leader Corneliu Zelea 
Codreanu and the aims of the movement. 
 Codreanu developed the Legion of the Archangel Michael as a splinter movement of 
Alexandru C. Cuza’s National-Christian Defense League, which held deeply antisemitic, 
nationalist, and anti-democratic principles. The splinter was likely caused by the rift in 
methods proposed by Cuza, a professor, and Codreanu, a student who pushed for achieving 
the aims of the organization via methods outside of the traditional parliamentary system. 
From its inception the Legion held the rebirth and purification of the Romanian nation as its 
primary aim, which was to be achieved through a process of returning the intellectuals and 
Romanian middle classes to the Orthodox morality of the peasantry. Such rhetoric was 
commonplace throughout the right wing movements of Europe during the period, however 
with the creation of “nests”, or work camps, the Romanian Iron Guard attempted to breed the 
“New Man” sculpted upon those very principles it stood for, within a parallel society. For 
Codreanu, Orthodox morality was central to achieving his parallel society, through which the 
democratic political order could be challenged, and it is this Orthodox centrality that is 
                                                 
2
 Emilio Gentile, “Fascism as Political Religion,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1990):.229. 
3
 S Fischer-Galati, “ ‘Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality’ in the Twentieth Century: the Romanian Case,” 
East European Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1 (March 1984):  25-35. 
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argued to separate the Iron Guard from the other European movements.
4
 Historians, 
therefore, have found it far harder to separate the Legion from its Orthodox roots than they 
have to separate almost every other fascist movement from its religious symbolism. Upon 
such difficulties, the relationship of the Iron Guard and Orthodoxy has been rewritten 
frequently in an attempt to accurately discern whether it was another example of a political 
movement dressed in sacralized form, or a political movement in which the Orthodox 
religion was an intrinsic pillar. 
 One of the most damning articles written on the relationship of the Iron Guard and 
Orthodoxy is that written by Ioanid, who argues that the Legion ‘is to be seen as an attempt at 
subordinating and transforming that [Orthodox] theology into a political instrument in a way 
that made it the enemy of genuine Christian values and spirituality.’5 Such arguments use the 
cult of death that developed in the movement, as it did in many Fascist movements, as 
example of the fact that spiritualism became twisted into a violent and revolutionary fervor 
that in doing so lost its connections to true Orthodoxy. The Romanian nation was defined by 
the Legion as the combined struggle of not only living Romanians, but also Romanians past 
and future. As such, the nationalism of the movement developed a spiritualism that 
emphasized resurrection and glory in death.
6
 Such principles clearly stretch Orthodox 
teaching, but were invaluable as a political catalyst that sparked the nationalist fervor 
required by fascist movements. The Iron Guard’s characteristics, as listed by Ioanid, include 
antisemitism, racism and anti-Communism, each of which are popularized by the radical 
                                                 
4
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Vol.4, No..3 (2003): 145. 
5
 Radu Ioanid, “The Sacralised Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard,” Totalitarian Movements and Political 
Religions Vol.5, Issue.3 (2004): 419.  (Hereafter, Ioanid, ”Sacralised Politics”). 
6
 Rebecca Haynes, “The Romanian Legionary Movement, Popular Orthodoxy and the Cult of Death,” in, 
Mioara Anton, Florin Anghel, Cosmin Popa (eds.), Hegemoniile trecutului: Evoluţii româneşti: Profesorului 
Ioan Chiper la 70 de ani, (Bucharest: Editura Curtea Veche, 2006), 117. (Hereafter, Haynes, Popular 
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nationalism that the Guard was able to build.
7
 Importantly, it was the Legion’s use of 
Orthodox symbolism and rhetoric that enabled the realization of its nationalist policies.
8
 Such 
a description of events inevitably leads to the conclusion that the Legion bent the legitimate 
support of the populace for Orthodox spiritualism in order to pursue its political aims. 
Beyond this, the fact that the movement never gained the official approval of the Orthodox 
Church is also used to argue that the two institutions were not ideologically homogeneous.
9
  
Without the official approval of the institution the Guard claimed to defend from foreign 
influences, the legitimate nature of its claims to Orthodoxy are put into question. As a result 
of these factors, it is argued that the political aims of the movement far outweighed its 
religious principles, thus explaining how these principles became distorted by political 
interests.  
 In contrast, the centrality of the Legion’s religious principles allowed it to attract a 
large proportion of Orthodox priests to its ranks, showing just how complimentary the two 
institutions could be. If the movement was able to attract priests on the local level, but fail to 
receive the support of the church officially, there appears to be a separation between the 
religion itself and its institution. Those priests that were active members, and even 
represented the movement politically, clearly felt no contradiction between their religion and 
the Legion. It appears, therefore, that the motive behind the church’s lack of recognition of 
the movement were of the political nature rather than a condemnation of their claims to 
Orthodox values. The fact that the ‘Legion blended religious and secular elements’ made it 
‘ultimately a heretic movement.’ 10  Furthermore, the relationship between the Orthodox 
                                                 
7
 Ioanid, Sacralised Politics, 419. 
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 Irina Ognyanova, “Between the Radical State and the Christian Rampart: Ustasha Ideology, Catholic Values, 
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9
 Ioanid, Sacralised Politics, 436. 
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 Constantin Iordachi, “Charisma, Religion, and Ideology: Romania’s Interwar Legion of the Archangel 
Michael,” in, John Campe and Mark Mazower (eds.), Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of 
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institution and the Legion was not entirely negative. With the creation of a “Greater 
Romania” as a result of the settlement of World War I, the influx of other religions pressured 
the Orthodox Church during the latter half of the 1920s to attain a degree of collaboration 
with the Legion.
11
 During the 1930s, however, this relationship was altered again, as the 
charismatic leadership of the Legion began to conflict with the required charismatic 
relationship of the church and its followers.
12
 The relationship between the Orthodox Church 
and the Legion is therefore better described as one in flux, with the political interests of the 
church a significant factor in its determination. It is for this reason that whilst the Orthodox 
Church did not always collaborate with, and in the end openly condemned, the Legion, this 
does not necessarily put into question the legitimacy or centrality of the Legion’s Orthodox 
principles. 
 
 Codreanu’s founding of the Legion was done so through the auspices of a spiritual 
movement, rather than a political one.
13
 From its inception, therefore, the Legion held no 
specific political program, but instead aimed to pursue the development of spiritualism as 
could be found in the peasantry. As we have already discussed, the focus placed onto the 
Orthodox values of the peasantry found significant precedent amongst nineteenth century 
intellectuals. Of course, it would be too far to indicate that the Legion was initiated as an 
apolitical movement, due to the fact that those values it promoted were done so with the aim 
to ‘create and educate the so-called “New Man”… through whom the Romanian nation as a 
whole would eventually be renewed.’14 It can therefore be seen that despite no political 
program being established by the movement, it certainly held both political ambitions and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 36. (Hereafter, 
Iordachi, Charisma). 
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principles. The extent to which these political principles clashed with, or molded their 
religious ones, is the area at which historiography is most divided. Despite this division 
however, it is clear from the birth of the movement that the religious and political principles 
were tightly interwoven. The Legion’s political principles, primarily the recreation of a 
Romania free from foreign influences, were laced with Orthodox sentiment. As the backbone 
of “Romanian-ness”, Orthodox values and spiritualism were identified as inseparable features 
of the new Romania. Simultaneously, the education of Orthodoxy was required as a means to 
recreate the nation, as well as to purify the middle and upper classes, and to repel influences 
that were foreign to the nation. Such an understanding of this relationship implies that the 
Orthodox religion did not exist in the Legion as merely a means to an end, but that it was also 
an end in itself. As such, the religiosity of the Legion is legitimized by how tightly 
interwoven the Orthodox values and spiritualism were with the political aims of the 
movement. 
 The epitomization of this interwoven relationship between the Legion’s political and 
Orthodox principles can be found within Codreanu’s work camps, which put into action the 
ruralization of the middle classes. These camps brought students, lecturers and urban groups 
into an environment wherein they could be educated in Orthodox morality and achieve purity 
through physical labor and work in the local rural community. The engagement achieved 
between these camps and the communities in which they were located was clear from the 
rapidity in which the camp system expanded throughout Romania, growing from a single 
camp in 1928 to seventy-one work camps by 1936
15
, without counting thousands of smaller 
Legion work sites. The political aim of these camps were to develop a parallel society outside 
the realms of the traditional government, through which traditional institutions could 
eventually be challenged. Whilst it may be argued that these camps were the expression of 
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the Legion’s political ambitions, it would be erroneous to suggest they did not also express 
the Legion’s spiritualism. These camps were not merely locations around which 
revolutionary emotion could be developed and the political principles of the movement could 
be realized, they also performed ‘vital moral, regenerative and educational functions.’16 It 
would be within these camps that a  generation of pure Orthodox Romanians were to be 
created, and emerge to reclaim Romania from those influences that had infested traditional 
society and its institutions. Such motivations went, in the case of the Legion, far beyond a 
mere propagandistic religious layer, as Orthodoxy became synonymous with nationality and 
its political aims became inseparable from its religious sentiments.  
 As a result of the development of such a close relationship between the Legion and 
Orthodoxy, historians have debated, in regard to the wider implications of the role played by 
religion in fascist movements, the role of Orthodoxy in the creation of strong discriminatory 
and violently antisemitic principles. The Iron Guard developed, through its assimilation by 
Antonescu and King Carol II into a governmental body, its antisemitism into a support of the 
German concentration camps and the development of xenophobic ideas of racial superiority 
alike that found in National Socialism.
17
 The movement became, as was common in fascist 
movements, one bound in violence and surrounded in the spiritual rhetoric of death and 
resurrection. It is here, that many prescribe the area in which the Iron Guard ideology 
transcended its Orthodox principles, and developed its own spiritualism that would facilitate 
notions of violent nationalism, political assassinations and self-sacrifice. As an example of 
this development, Legionaries were added to the list of Orthodox saints, whilst ideologists 
reimagined the Romanian nation as having its own spirit to encompass all those who would 
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live and die in its name.
18
 It is therefore possible to envisage how the Legion’s links to 
Orthodoxy could be lost in the 1930s under the strength of its nationalist focus, its deep 
antisemitism and its cult of death. It is here too that the strongest argument can be made in 
favor of the idea that the Iron Guard adapted Orthodoxy for its political aims. With a taste of 
power in Romania, the Guard developed an increasingly radical ideology, which distanced 
itself further from Orthodoxy and closer to the generic spiritual rhetoric that both legitimized 
and motivated violent nationalism. It becomes self-evident that the strength of the political 
principles of antisemitism, anti-Communism, and nationalism became the driving force for 
the movement. 
 Despite these changes, there exists evidence to suggest that Orthodoxy within 
Romania had already become associated to xenophobia, antisemitism and an increasing 
degree of chauvinism.
19
 Through the work of Nichifor Crainic, who sought the fusion of 
intellectual life and Orthodoxy, Romanian nationality was put in contrast with values of the 
West through the argument that it belonged in the East, which was represented by Orthodoxy. 
From this intellectual milieu, Orthodoxy became a contrasting figurehead to materialism, 
internationalism, liberalism and democratic equality.
20
 With this contrast to Western values, 
then it is unsurprising that Orthodoxy developed for some into a chauvinistic and xenophobic 
ideology. Whilst the religious principles of the regime may not have driven the violent 
realization of its political principles, they remained set in the symbolism of Orthodox 
spiritualism. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that these violent manifestations of 
spirituality can be located within either Orthodox teaching or contemporary religious 
discourse. ‘The Revelation of John’, for example, facilities the ideological premise for the 
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cult of death, with its descriptions of the resurrection of the “glorified savior,” which found 
its way into Legionary ideology through Codreanu as savior. Furthermore, Christianity 
contains a great deal of interaction between the living and the dead, from the symbolism of 
the eucharist to the story of Christ, and whilst the Legion exaggerated these notions in its 
nationalist form, they remained fundamentally Christian. For these reasons the alterations 
made by the Legion did not break with either traditional teachings of the Orthodox Church, 
nor did they break with the interpretations of Orthodoxy found in Romania from the late 
twentieth century. As a result of this, the principles through which ethnic and political 
violence could be justified, did not contradict the Orthodox principles as they existed in 
Romania. It may also be said that it was from this very fundamental Christian symbolism, 
that the cult of blood and death was developed. 
 Not only did the Legion not contradict Orthodoxy, but its cultural manifestations were 
also deeply rooted in Orthodox culture. Just as Orthodoxy had for generations been 
manifested through the iconography of particular figures, Legionary culture would include 
the production of icons of Codreanu, to be carried by Legionaries alongside Orthodox figures 
in their pockets.
21
 Furthermore, imagery of the cross was manifest in the placement of crosses 
atop hills and mountains in association with the work camps and the rhetoric of physical 
labor. Beyond this, before every meeting of the Iron Guard and as a part of every ceremony, 
an Orthodox liturgy would be given by Orthodox priests, which provides further evidence of 
the cultural value of Orthodoxy to the Legion. Many of the goals dictated by Codreanu 
involved notions of salvation, reconciliation with God, education and rejuvenation of 
Christian morality. The doctrine of the Legion remained fused with Orthodox imagery and 
language, from its inception throughout the Second World War. In regard to the culture of the 
Legion, the modification of Orthodoxy for political ends did not take place. Whilst the 
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Legion would create new martyrs for celebration, and new goals for Orthodox understanding, 
they were consistently fabricated through Orthodox modes. This can be seen from the fact 
that the Legionaries culture did not alienate priests and prevent the coexistence of an 
Orthodox and legionnaire lifestyle. Despite the fact that priests and the church would not 
officially condone the violent methodology of the movement, even the religious justifications 
for these methods did not contradict Orthodox teaching. With the Legion’s utilization of 
Orthodox imagery and principles within its culture, mixed with its Orthodox values and 
moral goals, it is difficult to separate Legionary culture from contemporary Romanian 
Orthodox culture. It can therefore be argued that with reference to the culture of the Legion, 
the religious content molded the political principles, as only principles that were consistent 
with the deep Orthodox culture could be facilitated by the Legion. 
 In order to exemplify how religious and political principles interacted within the 
Legion, we must include Codreanu’s ‘For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)’22. This text was 
written in order to piece together the story of the Legion’s creation, as well as Codreanu’s 
political story in general. Through the text we are able to discern each of the factors we have 
discussed, with Codreanu distancing himself from Western values, as well as the building of 
a movement that sought to achieve, through political means, a spiritual goal. The book, in 
reference to the creation of the movement, refers to the Legion as ‘more a school and an army 
than a political party’ which will produce ‘a great educator and leader who can defeat the 
powers of evil.’23 As can be seen, the language used by Codreanu is indicatory of a person 
who held religion as a vital part of his movement, which transcends the idea that Orthodoxy 
was the means to attain power. Whilst, of course, the text must be treated with caution, this 
caution is best directed at those areas in which a chronological account is fabricated in order 
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 Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, For My Legionaries: (The Iron Guard), (York (SC): Liberty Bell Publications, 
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to serve the propagandistic purposes of the Legion. One finds many reasons to query 
Codreanu’s political motivations, both in producing the book, and in the themes of violence 
and antisemitism that are consistent throughout. In no way, however, does the book show any 
conscious signs that the Legionary movement wished to manipulate its religious principles to 
achieve political power. Furthermore, one does not find reason to query the centrality of 
Christianity to the Legion, either in its aims or in its methods of achieving them. 
 Beyond this, from the same text it is possible to see the cognitive link between 
Christian notions of self-sacrifice and the Archangel Michael, developed into a violent 
nationalism and cult of death. The depth with which Codreanu believed in defending 
Orthodox Romanian-ness led him to create the Legion which would combat the system 
because it was ‘better to end our life dying to the last man up in the mountains for our 
faith.’24 Not only is Codreanu showing the passion with which the Legion would defend 
Christianity, but he also shows the notions of sacrifice that frequents Christian teaching. As 
this quote suggests, the Legionary movement did not merely manipulate Orthodox teachings, 
but used its language and teachings in order to develop a violent movement aiming to defend 
Romanian Orthodoxy from the perceived threat of Judeo-Bolshevism. Codreanu develops the 
requirement of a violent nature from the iconography of Archangel Michael in the Church of 
the Coronation in Alba-Iulia, which reads: ‘Towards the unclean hearts who come into the 
most pure House of the Lord, I mercilessly point my sword.’25 As can be seen, the aims of the 
Legion were developed in Codreanu through the ideas of the Orthodox church. Whilst it 
would be erroneous to suggest Orthodoxy is in itself a violent ideology, it would be equally 
erroneous to argue that Romanian Orthodox ideas did not act as the basis of the Legion’s 
violence. 
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 The relationship between religion and the Legionary movement is one that finds 
increased relevance in contemporary historiographical debates in regard to the development 
of an increasingly violent form of Islam in European movements.
26
 It is important, as a result 
of these debates, to understand the role played by religion in these movements. Whilst 
religion itself cannot be deemed a violent ideology, it should also not be held above 
discussion into the origins of violent messages and ideas. The Legion holds, as a result of 
these discussions, an important position in historicism as an example of a movement that 
maintained a strong religious culture and principles that were both political and religious. The 
Legion exemplifies the possibility of an interconnection between deep religious belief and 
extreme political views. As we have discussed, it is wrong to suggest that Orthodoxy does not 
contain messages within it that can be used as the basis for violent movements, due to the fact 
that notions of self-sacrifice and the interplay of living and dead are not only present but 
fundamental to it. Orthodoxy, therefore, does not require subordination or transformation in 
order to produce the aims, principles, and methods that it did in the Legion. Historians such 
as Ioanid have been too fast to argue, due to the horrors produced by the Legion in regard to 
the Holocaust and its cult of death,  that these must have occurred due to some manipulation 
or distortion of Orthodox ideology for political ends. The Legion is an extreme case in point, 
however, as we have shown, the religious content of the Legion was legitimately Orthodox 
and consistently appealing to Orthodox priests due to its assimilation of the religious with the 
political. The Legion, therefore, does not represent a manipulation of Orthodox values in the 
political sphere, but an extreme case of Orthodox values merged with a racist and nationalist 
political fervor. As such, it is vital to understand that religion may be used in combination 
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